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This important line is omitted from Android Enterprise Security White Paper 2021 which exists in 2020 paper: "The Verified Boot state is used as an input in the process to derive disk encryption keys."...
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..."If the Verifed Boot state changes (e.g. the user unlocks the bootloader), then the secure hardware prevents access to data used to derive the disk encryption keys that were used when the bootloader was locked."
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What is the cryptographic relationship between verified boot state and FBE keys? Does it pass as a constant input to KDF to derive a key that decrypts FBE keys?
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Also worth noting that it also changes based on verified boot key while locked. Nexus 5X, Nexus 6P, Pixel and Pixel XL predated AVB and essentially relied on this for verified boot enforcement since they didn't directly enforce the verified boot key or verified boot state.
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Was not a good system for enforcing verified boot but thankfully that was resolved for the Pixel 2 and later along with most non-Pixel devices now. A lot of non-Pixel phones definitely still have a flawed approach to verified boot enforcement, especially for yellow boot state.
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An attacker shouldn't be able to boot up a different set of OS images while the device is locked and isn't able to do that on AVB devices with proper verified boot enforcement. It shouldn't work at all and it's still a serious problem if they can do it but can't derive keys.
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