Conversation

Bringing security to existing ecosystems is delicate. All user pain must be: 1) aggressively minimized (by design, tooling or tradeoff) 2) justified by a security gain (more concrete the bigger the pain) 3) effectively communicated (if you do x, you get benefit y)
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More emergent damage of DMARC: since it forces the envelope MailFrom to be the same as the From header (for no good reason, since it's meant to protect the latter, and the former is invisible), my newsletter bounces are now going to my FastMail inbox instead of Mailgun ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
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DMARC is utter trash, and I say that as someone who's been running mail servers for two decades. These days, a large fraction of spam passes SPF, DKIM, and even DMARC. Origin domain reputation is really the only useful signal.
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You're still going to get a ton of spoofed mail, just not with FROM headers for domains with DMARC p=reject or p=quarantine. Spam doesn't need to use spoofed mail and it's somewhat hard to understand why a spammer would even do that since it's much more likely to be filtered.
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Being able to send emails as other people is a problem. It's not a problem that's being solved any time soon thanks to there being so much apathy and active resistance to fixing email but thankfully email can be largely replaced and phased out since it's not going to get fixed.