Restrictions on dynamic native code generation is not a security boundary it's a walled garden market control boundary.
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And perf events? Seccomp trivially blocks all access.
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A problem with that is that you can't undo making the seccomp filter to do debugging/profiling without spawning the application again.
Due to the design of the system call API, you can't really do anything more than disallowing it as a whole. Can't allow a small portion of it.
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Granularity of seccomp-bpf is based on system calls and integer parameters. Look at how the io_uring kernel API is set up as another example. If you don't fully disallow it, it bypasses an ever increasing amount of seccomp-bpf filtering since it's blind to what's behind pointers.
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Landlock LSM (kernel.org/doc/html/lates) is meant to be the solution to seccomp-bpf being too crippled as a way to do self-sandboxing. I don't think they'll be receptive to seccomp-bpf needs in how they design system calls. Just look at what they did with io_uring already.
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Landlock looks promising (a first for LSMs) but largely unneeded IMO. Namespaces + seccomp pretty much fully suffice. Seccomp to block all newfangled syscalls and trace/debug type stuff, and ns's for virtualizing resources.
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For the most part namespaces don't restrict what processes do. They gain capabilities via the kernel and other processes via file descriptors.
Mount namespaces give them their own path hierarchy but don't sandbox their filesystem access. Similar for most other than userns.
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Gain capabilities? That's not a thing unless you botched the basics (nosuid).
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In a user namespace, you can't gain any new capabilities outside of your user namespace. User namespaces are where all the most important stuff happens.
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And mount namespaces do sandbox filesystem access but you have to know how to use them. It involves bind mounting over things that should not be accessible (or that you want to interpose different content over) and then making a new nested namespace so they can't be undone.
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That's changing what's accessible via paths, not sandboxing filesystem access. The program isn't restricted from accessing files passed to it from outside the sandbox in any way. If the user opens a file with an application via system UI, something is being passed to the app, etc
I'm aware of how mount namespaces work. Changing what can be accessed via paths is a much different thing than restricting which files can actually be accessed. Mount namespaces are doing the former rather than the latter. Same applies to other non-user namespaces.
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I'm assuming if you pass a file descriptor into the sandbox from outside it, you're okay with it being accessed. If you don't want that, don't do it.
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