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There should have been no way to get to that situation without: 1. Being offered the option to use the passphrase as input to a KDF, with warning about strength. 2. Being warned to store key backup on paper, and that data WILL BE GONE PERMANENTLY if you don't.
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They do use a KDF but only use the resulting key to encrypt the header. It's the approach used by most disk encryption implementations in order to allow the user to rotate the password without having to encrypt the whole drive again, only the header. Easy to make that atomic too.
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Sure, but the user wanting to change their passphrase is different than them wanting to rotate the underlying disk encryption key. It could require a lot of time and storage space or simply backing up, resetting and restoring from the backup.
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How does it know which block is encrypted with a given key for block-based encryption? I can see how this could be implemented for higher-level filesystem-level encryption but I don't think either the ext4/f2fs approach or the ZFS approach provides incremental rekeying.
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The ext2/f2fs encryption approach is essentially still block-based encryption by the way and they still need a global key for metadata. It's entirely possible to use with ONLY a boot passphrase and end result is essentially the same. They do encrypt every block when set up right.
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