It can't cheat by wrapping all the around and back into the same object. It's a bit silly that the safe one is called wrapping_add because allowing wrapping is only one of the things it allows.
Note that ptr::wrapping_add is safe and ptr::add is unsafe due to the UB.
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It's UB to deference a pointer outside the bounds of the object it was derived from regardless of which one you use. The purpose of ptr::add is that it's also undefined to create the pointer outside bounds of the object which enables optimizations even if load isn't right there.
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i need you to realize you linked me at the exact same part of rust docs that i, myself, linked. i was not asking why one is safe and the other is not, i was asking what optimization differences there are
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llvm.org/docs/GetElemen is informative in a subtle way: because an inbounds gep cannot overflow, the compiler can make assumptions about ordering of pointers, among other things
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Main guarantees is that it's in-bound. ptr::wrapping_add method is poorly named. The main difference is that it permits the result to not be within the bounds of the object. Disallowing wrapping as part of inbounds is a bonus thing.
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So, among many other things, it's guaranteed to not be a null pointer and null checks can be eliminated. A negative offset will go backwards within the object, a positive offset will go forwards within the object (up to one byte past the end) and a zero offset will stay the same.
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"a `negative offset` will go backwards within the object" is not necessarily true, and the entire reason i'm looking closely at these functions
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if you have a 2^31+1 byte alloc in a 2^32-byte address space, 0x80000001 may be a valid offset that does not go backwards
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A valid offset by C rules, but to the non-allocated byte one past the end, and UB to actually dereference. You need at least a 2^31+2 byte allocation for 0x80000001 to be a valid offset of an allocated byte.
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Neither GCC or LLVM supports ptrdiff+1 size allocations. Both of them delegate responsibility to the malloc and mmap implementations in libc to report an error for overflow large allocations. Some malloc implementations handle this and others (glibc) are broken with GCC/LLVM.
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Rust explicitly defines isize::MAX as the maximum size object that's permitted. Unsafe code needs to uphold this by making sure not to do it.
Some malloc implementations like musl & jemalloc have this check internally but Rust has to check itself with an unknown/generic malloc.
See gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_ for a thread about this. ptrdiff_t+1 or larger objects are just not permitted with LLVM and GCC. It's not a C standard violation but rather they require that all standard ways of allocating objects (C, POSIX) have checks preventing larger objects.
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I helped fix multiple malloc and libc implementations but there are still common ones like glibc that are broken with GCC/LLVM. It's a bad idea to use objects larger than PTRDIFF_MAX even with a compiler supporting it since x-y will be undefined if it overflows.
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