SSHFP works well. I set it up for every A/AAAA record with a bogus value if it's something like a DNS round robin record that's not supposed to used for login.
Consider it part of the same thing as setting up DANE TLSA records for every TLS service which is each non-SSH service.
Conversation
WebPKI offers no real value over DANE TLSA records beyond Certificate Transparency and only Chromium fully enforces CT as of this month when backdating certificates to bypass it stopped being possible (due to 3 year issuance when they started requiring CT). Just started working.
2
1
Firefox doesn't enforce it and Safari just started their own policy so they can't fully enforce it for almost another year (which is now the max lifetime largely thanks to Apple's unilateral decision to force it).
Never seen any non-browser bother doing real WebPKI support.
1
Nearly everything else just uses the WebPKI CAs without actually enforcing WebPKI rules beyond that. Some things hard-wire CA pins which is very risky without an out-of-band update mechanism. Few things do leaf pinning and those that do often fail to support rotation properly.
1
Reality is that if you control DNS or at least can appear to control DNS, you can trivially obtain a valid Let's Encrypt or other CA certificate. It's not really misissuance if you don't have DNSSEC + CAA. Hardly anyone checks CT meaningfully beyond making sure it's the right CA.
1
1
I'm looking forward to Let's Encrypt deploying accounturi support to production. They have it in staging (used for dry runs by certbot, etc.) but I can't get information on when it's going to be deployed to production. We use that for grapheneos.org, etc. alongside TLSA.
1
1
1
Look at the CAA records for grapheneos.org and then one of the subdomains like matrix.grapheneos.org. They each have their staging and production accounturi pinned for Let's Encrypt. It'll be nice when they start enforcing in prod. TLSA in browsers would ofc be nicer.
1
1
accounturi at least makes certificate issuance secure for the CA you choose to trust. It doesn't stop other CAs from ignoring DNSSEC/CAA, being compromised, etc. but at least for us our users can assume it's an invalid certificate if it's not Let's Encrypt which is easy to check.
2
If CT requires the CA to publish the CAA record they used to issue it and the signature chain leading to the CAA record, clients could automatically reject fraudulently generated certs.
1
The way it works is they know the domain they control for it and they know the format of their extended options such as accounturi and validationmethods. I don't really think a client could easily enforce CAA records even with that approach. It's not really designed for it.
2
I don't think the # of CAs is really even bounded. Let's Encrypt was a working, trusted CA before they had their ISRG root in CA programs. CA programs also didn't explicitly approve the cross-signing of their root. It may have had to be disclosed, but not explicitly approved.
Let's Encrypt decided that their CAA domain would be letsencrypt.org and CA programs / browsers aren't aware of it or any the other values.
Any CA can just unilaterally decide that they are authorizing another CA via cross-sign. They just may be required to disclose it.
1
And I'm sure any sub-CA is meant to follow the same rules and the CA who authorizes them is supposedly responsible for it.
If they actually serve a ton of users, CA programs are super reluctant to remove them even if they make really sketchy / bad choices about sub-CAs.
1
Show replies