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Now that HPKP is removed, browsers should do what they should have done from the beginning by supporting DNSSEC and DANE as a pinning mechanism. No need to support using it as an alternate root of trust. For compatibility can limit it to when DoT or DoH are being used by default.
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Please don't let them impose inane policies on what sort of DANE records are acceptable for web. Anything should be accepted and completely override webpki if DANE semantics say it does (DANE-EE(3) or -TA(2) vs PKIX-*(0 or 1)).
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They aren't going to implement it. It's very clear that it isn't going to happen. It's never going to get implemented if it's only advocated as a replacement for WebPKI instead of something usable alongside it. I want it to get implemented.
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Replaced those tweets with another one that's less specific about how they could address the concerns they've raised about it in the past. It can be implemented in a way that sidesteps all of their concerns and then those things can be argued over time as separate issues.
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Similarly, the only reason I mentioned the option of ignoring long TTL records is because I know they'll bring that up as an argument against pinning in general. I wasn't saying they SHOULD do it but that they COULD so their argument doesn't make sense. Perhaps it wasn't clear.
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Support DNSSEC and verify TLSA records on top of what they already implement rather than replacing it. As long as I can pin the public keys of leaf certificates, I'll be happy. I don't care about avoiding the need to use something like Let's Encrypt. Not a hill I want to die on.
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