Now that HPKP is removed, browsers should do what they should have done from the beginning by supporting DNSSEC and DANE as a pinning mechanism. No need to support using it as an alternate root of trust. For compatibility can limit it to when DoT or DoH are being used by default.
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If an attacker controls the DNS records, they can get a DV certificate. Only supporting using it for pinning would be fine. It isn't mandatory to use it as a replacement for WebPKI. I don't expect browser vendors to do that. They can implement a subset they consider appropriate.
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WebPKI enforced requirements for supported algorithms, key sizes, Certificate Transparency via Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCTs), etc. would remain the same.
If at a later point they decided to offer an alternative to CAs instead of only supporting pinning, that's an option.
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