Details can be found here wp.puri.sm/posts/librem5-
Conversation
"The SPI flash will be read only so the firmware blobs [run on the secondary processor] can’t be modified without the user knowing."
This all stems from seeking RYF certification and making use of the secondary processor exception.
1
This is just one example. There are other ways it is approached. It is also part of how they make their laptops. So, if the firmware has signature verification, they'll block updating it somehow. If it doesn't, it'll still end up being blocked since components lack open firmware.
1
If there is a security feature that they see as reducing 'freedom' (with a very odd way of defining freedom) it will be deliberately left either not set up or permanently disabled via fuses. They see it as failure if there is any signed or closed firmware that can be updated.
1
1
And the 'solution' which is applied is preventing it from being updated. This is the MAIN CRITERIA for their choice of components: whether they can block firmware from being updated. So for example, if there are separate data lines for firmware updates, that's perfect to them.
1
Doesn't matter if it's horribly outdated and/or insecure. The decision making is based on whether they can technically have an OS without proprietary components and no way of updating proprietary components from the OS. That is the goal - and not just a transitional one, really.
1
They'll pay lip service to actually open hardware and firmware but it's not really part of what they want to achieve. End goal is RYF certification and they want to obtain that through making the firmware count as 'hardware' by preventing updates to it to make it out of scope.
2
2
So you keep repeating this over and over but Purism has very explicitly rejected this characterization and clarified they will continue to allow full user control over their firmware.
1
"RYF is clear that any software that can be updated using the CPU must be free software. Our (Purism’s) interpretation is that it does not force a requirement that firmware cannot be upgraded out-of-band from the CPU, or external to regular software updates."
2
Right. So users are free to update it if they like, just not via the OS CPU. That seems reasonable. I prefer this even, as it means if my day to day OS is compromised and later patched I don't need to wonder if my firmware was backdoored.
2
No, that's untrue, as stated above. Only in some cases are they capable of doing that, and a user is not going to attach a JTAG cable to each component on a monthly basis to flash firmware updates. That's ridiculous + also misses it's blocked when it was how they implemented it.
One could hook up a special firmware update cable specifically designed for this purpose if updates were really that frequent, or a dip switch.
I don't want my OS to be able to secretly update the firmware without my express physical consent.
1
The updates are quite frequent, and if you were familiar with any of this, you would know that. You'd know that when these components have security support, they receive regular updates. I'm not sure where you get the idea any of this has to be secret or insecure.
1