It's not just a couple weeks of work. The work being done is cutting huge corners because there is just not time to do it right and we all know it.
android-prepare-vendor is a gargantuan hack and we end up tossing in tons of blobs we -could- build if there were enough cycles.
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I feel like current efforts are doing some amazingly useful research (like hardened malloc remote attestation etc) however vendor is a massive can we keep kicking down the road with no clear path to resolve.
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Then I look at projects like PostmarketOS where the entire OS is less than the footprint of the stuff we are currently forced to blindly pullover from vendor for lack of time to properly sort through it, let alone the 250GB+ of AOSP code most people lack the hardware to build.
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This leaves me concluding that long term Android may not the right solution for those of us that want to maximize security and privacy.
Start with much leaner Linux that is basically a feature phone, then eventually rip out Linux too.
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So then if I am giving up on Android for my needs, I feel I might as well forge ahead on simpler hardware with fewer blob requirements and dramatically lower my expectations to what best-effort feature-phone type setups are achievable on pinephone/librem5 type hardware today.
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And in the mean time push vendors for at -least- a TPM to do coreboot-heads type measured boot or at best SoC level secure boot like Pixels have.
That said, stopping evil maid attacks is not the most important thing for my mobile device threat model.
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If I can give up stopping evil maid attacks and in turn get a feature phone in the very short term with a very small footprint easy to maintain/build OS... then that starts looking like something I could maintain as just one person until maintainable AOSP-first hardware emerges.
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Verified boot is one of MANY missing hardware security features, not the only or even the primary one, as stated earlier. You're not accurately representing what is lost, including ongoing security support and in one of the cases, an OEM not actively hostile to security...
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Evil maid is the obvious risk I understand.
I will again say here I would be very interested in specific remotely exploitable hw or fw vulns present on the Pinephone or Librem5.
Please detail them as it would no doubt impact how I and others are weighing risks.
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> Evil maid is the obvious risk I understand.
Verified boot is again one of many core hardware-based security features. I don't think it's anywhere near the highest importance among them. You're missing a lot more than verified boot. I don't know where you get the idea that's
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the major piece of the puzzle that's missing. In particular, the Librem 5 has gone out of the way to prevent full firmware upgrades, and has used hardware with very lackluster security and serious security issues. The OS is just a piece of the privacy/security stack as a whole.
I don't like your attitude and how you approach this in terms of communicating and the kind of dubious / false claims you make. I'm not going to give you long-form write ups of my knowledge / research especially on Twitter. You can do what you want but don't try to make false
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claims about it and misrepresent the compromises involved as you are repeatedly doing. My recommendation to you was to at least use the Pinephone and avoid worse problems. If you want to ignore that recommendation, that's fine, but don't expect me to spend more time on this.
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Which parts of the Librem 5 are particularly terrible from a security perspective?