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i am once again asking you to free me from the necessity to compile android from source to have a phone i'm comfortable using
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when i upgrade my laptop i'm going to get one with two 2280 NVMe slots. this will allow me to store two android build trees at once instead of one
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i would also like to have a third security model, something in between "anyone who downloads fastboot.exe can do anything with your phone" and "if you forget the passphrase you have to desolder the eMMC and reimage it with a sector level backup of OEM partitions"
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(yes i know that avb_custom_key lets me do this, provided i build my OS from source, add every system app i need to the manifest, and maintain signing keys long-term. contrary to what you might expect i do not enjoy any of that)
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avb_custom_key is also weird because the warning screen, despite having plenty of room, only displays 8 hex digits of the sha256 of the custom key so...why display it at all? i think nation-state level attackers might be able to build a supercomputer that can brute force 32 bits
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Only use case for the displayed fingerprint would be verifying that you didn't just install a different OS than what you intended to download and flash, i.e. it was replaced by an attacker at some point. Even if they displayed twice as many bits though, 64 bits is still useless.
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On the initial generation of Pixels, I convinced them to display more bits of the signature. That was before custom keys had proper enforcement as part of the verified boot process. It was only indirectly enforced via integration into encryption key derivation before the Pixel 2.
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