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I don't really know what reproducible builds prove, that the build server wasn't compromised? If Signal were malicious, they could just add a bugdoor, so you still have to trust them not to be malicious. 🤷🏻‍♂️
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Reproducible builds make most sense together with open source, of course. And it's of value even if nobody is constantly verifying the builds. Simply the point that they could mitigates the vector of a malicious builds server. Source level backdoors are certainly not addressed.
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You can prove the build server isn't compromised, but you can't prove you're not trying to hide a backdoor, right? So users still have to trust you, and you could get the same benefit from getting a third party to privately repro the build for you...
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I don't fully agree. It is still easier to hide a backdoor in (obfuscated) binary code than it is in (written-to-be-maintainable) source code. Config should ideally be included. And there are other code quality benefits of reproducible builds besides security (testing, deltas).
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Oh, I never thought they _prevented_ backdoors, only that some of the easier vectors for introducing them are being mitigated. And that seems a good thing, especially in combination with my strong suspicion (only anecdata, though) that it helps code (or at least build) quality.
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And since I can't see any real harm with reproducible builds (besides the work it takes to set up in the first place) - i.e. no runtime overhead etc - I don't see the usual discussion of cost of mitigation measures to factor in much in this debate. So, why not build reproducibly?
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The theoretical benefits of reproducible builds are based on the theoretical benefits of open source. I don't think reality matches anything close to the hype. I don't think either does much to avoid trust in vendors/developers. I think both help making software better though.
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