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Also CC: . Curious about how changing the heap impl at the OS level, so even libc picks it up, would affect fingerprinting. Or, generalized: how changing certain low-level OS bits affect fingerprinting.
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Yes, definitely, see the thread I wrote at twitter.com/DanielMicay/st. Chromium uses the system allocator rather than TCMalloc on Android so Vanadium on GrapheneOS uses hardened_malloc. My assumption is that with JavaScript enabled it can be identified as Vanadium on GrapheneOS.
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blog.jse.li/posts/chrome-7 This applies to many of the ongoing attempts at anti-fingerprinting across browsers. Performance testing can bypass many of the attempts at hiding information about the hardware and OS too. It can also be quite reliable. Talked about this a few days ago.
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The Tor Browser's anti-fingerprinting can't hide much about the hardware and OS with JavaScript enabled. Users can also still be fingerprinted via things like keyboard / mouse input. They remove a lot of surface for fingerprinting but it's often unclear what is accomplished.
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On a separate note, got to love the Mozilla employee in that thread not understanding the question and trying to imply that jemalloc isn't a massive security liability. Not sure why people attack a project without even reading the basic documentation like github.com/GrapheneOS/har.
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