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twitter.com/BrendanEich/st I don't see how this isn't DRM, and it's not a good precedent. Web sites would love to use this kind of DRM to prevent users from blocking advertisements or other unwanted features exactly like Brave is doing, and Brave would be locked out by that too.
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Replying to @DanielMicay @justsee and @bcrypt
DRM is WideVine. OS-level antifraud is not "DRM" in any useful sense of the TLA. I think @EFF agrees, but anyway, your further "enforced viewing" words were inaccurate and misleading! You mean: we make Brave Ads viewers pass OS-tested antifraud that the appstores require. Yes.
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DRM is when there's a TEE in your device in which secret keys you don't own are used to decrypt content. Brave Ads don't do that. You abusing "DRM" would be like me calling you "adfraud apologist." What do you suggest if not the OS-level antifraud checks native apps use? Be real!
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SafetyNet does have support for using secret keys in the TEE or HSM via key attestation. It doesn't currently enforce that key attestation passes, which is why it's currently so easy to bypass, but that's clearly going to change. TEE doesn't need to decrypt it for it to be DRM.
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You can call it anti-fraud or anti-cheat but it's effectively same thing. It's enforcing rules about how the user can use the app / content. Brave is producing content (the site with different ads) and enforcing rules about the user should be able to use that content. It's DRM.
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You're trying to make a distinction about the semantics. I'm not lying and what I'm saying isn't accurate. You can argue that since it's not 1:1 replacement it's not doing that. I personally don't care to play those games about the semantic details. I'm not having that argument.
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