No, because CGN.
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Where are you getting the assumption that CGN is widely used from? In most of Europe it most certainly is not. I can't emagine that it's significantly different in the US, and as far as I know there hasn't been a paper that covers this.
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NAT64 AIUI utterly breaks DNS privacy and security by requiring forged results and precluding contact with v4 hosts (like the DoH provider) via IP address.
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Under NAT64 with DNS64, the resolver provider is hostile: the ISP. Hostility of the ISP is the whole problem DoH is trying to solve. DNSSEC rightly makes it impossible to get valid signatures from such forged DNS results.
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I'm not sure how "Google provides DNS64" - the DNS64 results are specific to the NAT64'd network, no? And AIUI you'd have no way to reach Google's DNS on a NAT64 network.
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In the strict mode where it's explicitly configured, Android's DNS-over-TLS uses a traditional DNS lookup for the DNS server name and enforces that everything else goes via DNS-over-TLS and that it has a valid certificate. I have it set to "one.one.one.one" as an example.
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They require using a name for the DNS-over-TLS server configuration and always bootstrap it. If you don't explicitly configure it for strict mode the default is the opportunistic mode where it will transparency upgrade to DNS-over-TLS without enforcing having a valid certificate.