People are going to increasingly lose trust in video as a form of evidence. If it doesn't conform to your biases, it must be fake. If it does fit what you think, it's real. It's another step towards people living in completely different realities based on how they see the world.
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my personal conclusion is that we're well past that point without deepfakes
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For many people, definitely. I don't look forward to increasingly not being able to figure out the objective reality myself though. It's also a bit scary to think about how things like this are going to impact policing, trials, etc. when video increasingly can't be trusted.
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former: i'm not immune to propaganda already. it gets quantitatively worse, but probably not qualitatively
latter: that's what bothers me most about them, yeah
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i expect we'll get video sensors with built-in attestation. i was going for a while to ask you whether you think that can be done in remotely reliable way?
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It's definitely possible to use attestation for this, even with existing technology today like Android key attestation. However, as I mentioned in another thread we had about this, attestation based on chaining to a known intermediate or root is a weak form vs. strong pairing.
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I also don't feel that it should be treated as something that's nearly impossible to overcome by someone with physical access. It would be expensive, and there's probably the value in substantially raising the bar for this, but it could still be bypassed given enough money.
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I'm not so sure that powerful and rich organizations still being able to do it while taking it away from the masses is a positive thing. That can already be today today with a camera app using Android key attestation and relying on the weak chaining to the known Google root.
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The API supports chaining trust through the OS to the app. If you can exploit the OS, you can bypass OS enforced checks, but the signed attestation data includes the patch level which is a mitigating factor. It can definitely already be used for this today despite the weaknesses.
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i'm not sure if i would trust any of the existing SoCs here. attestation built into sensor silicon is a different question, but that raises more questions, like what do we do with compression
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The existing functionality is definitely only able to provide a very weak implementation, but it's enough to wipe out being able to create fakes for the masses. I don't think attestation can stop this if someone is willing to invest the money in bypassing the physical security.
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the reason i'm saying "sensor silicon" is that we have an ability to embed a OTP ROM on silicon that not readable by SEM or STM directly and isn't susceptible to contrast etching
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unfortunately i don't trust any of the silicon vendors to do everything else right and it would probably be possible to bypass it even if you use unique keys and post it to some kind of CT-style log
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