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Precisely this :). It’s like a whole bunch of people wearing Patagonia talking about how easy it is to climb this mountain vs. another when they’ve never done more than a day hike.
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Twitter: “exploit mitigations are so easy to bypass” Walking by office of someone who actually writes exploits: “damn, I’m still stuck trying to work around all this annoying shit”
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Yes, I have seen a bug be made unexploitable by a mitigation. Is it the norm? Heck no. Do professional vulndevs look for bugs that fit a pattern that makes exploitation easy? Yes. Do we have evidence that mitigations regularly push bugs into nonexploitable territory? I think not.
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But I agree on one thing: If you are severely bug- and interaction-restrained, mitigations *may* make a difference. But mostly they waste some of the attackers time, and a commensurate amount of defender time, so everybody happily keeps busy to no measurable effect :)
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Memory tagging is a very loose approximation of dynamic memory safety checking though. Can have some nice deterministic guarantees like easily guaranteeing every small / linear heap overflow is caught but for arbitrary read/write it's a very low entropy probabilistic mitigation.
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SPARC ADI and ARMv8.5 MTE have 4-bit tags. It's really not a lot of entropy for mitigating arbitrary read/write. Can reserve a tag never used for active heap allocations to mark freed data or maybe other things like a shadow stack as another mitigation. Not a lot of tags though.
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I'd really like to see proper efficient hardware support for integer overflow checking by propagating poison values internally and then trapping when attempting to use a value. Main barrier to automatic checking even in many higher level languages is the high performance cost.
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