Conversation

This Tweet was deleted by the Tweet author. Learn more
No, that's not what he means. He's saying that an external file system should have a sandboxed filesystem driver, so that exploiting a bug inside it doesn't immediately grant complete control over the entire system and at least requires privesc to escape (likely via the kernel).
1
4
It would be hard enough to make a microkernel secure if it was 50k lines of Rust with only 4k lines of unsafe code with potential memory corruption, let alone millions of lines of trusted C full of memory corruption from all kinds of trivial mistakes / oversights. It's a joke.
1
17
Just want to point out that seL4 is about 10K lines of C and is formally verified to use no UB, no OOB array access, no crashes, etc... Not trying to defend C but there are ways to make anything safe if you care enough. The problem is people don’t care.
3
8
Sure, but at that point it's not C. It's a subset of C that was verified via proofs. Those proofs are an extension to the language. Similarly, you can define a general purpose subset of C with annotations for ownership, lifetimes, etc. letting you write memory safe code.
2
1
There are ways to write C that are both completely idiomatic and amenable to static analysis, correctness proofs, etc. Doing so does not make it a weird and esoteric language that no longer resembles C. It makes it a much more readable and friendly language.
2
1