The question of whether memory unsafety implies UB is sort of at the heart of the disconnect between the C spec and C practitioners. As a practitioner (and compiler guy) I view memory unsafety as a separate thing - after all a “bad” store still stores to a well defined place.
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There is nothing well defined about what an out-of-bounds access or use-after-free will access. The compiler, linker and even runtime environment are assuming that is never going to happen and there's nothing defined about what the consequences are going to be from the C code.
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In the machine code output by the compiler, it's perfectly well defined what an out-of-bounds access or use-after-free will do, and to what, although of course it depends on runtime state. It's just undefined in the input C code.
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That's not a relevant response related to the thread. He states that he wants an optimizing compiler with a comparable amount of optimization, where the programmer is writing code for an abstract machine and the compiler is making transforms that preserve abstract semantics.
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That wasn't my interpretation of his Tweet at the time, but on looking at further context, I think you are correct
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I would definitely say that the standard should not say things are 'undefined' but rather come up with sensible constraints on how it should be implemented. Guaranteeing that signed overflow wraps would be a regression for safe implementations by forbidding them from trapping.
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Guaranteeing it either wraps or immediately traps would also be a regression, by forbidding more efficient implementations that trap as late as possible by propagating overflow errors via poison bits or poison values. UBSan is explicitly not designed as efficient. It's difficult.
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I do think the standard should forbid treating signed overflow as something that is guaranteed to never happen in order to optimize further, and the same goes for other cases like this. It's near impossible to do that for memory safety issues without requiring safety though.
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I think that's going to be a hard sell to compiler vendors — doesn't it mean people will have to rewrite their inner loops with size_t loop counters to get reasonable efficiency?
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Clang and GCC both implement it for both signed and unsigned integer overflow. It's not a hard sell to them. It's impractical to use it for unsigned overflow largely because it's well-defined and there are lots of intended overflows that are not actually bugs in the software.
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The standard permitting trapping on signed overflow for portable C code is useful regardless of what compilers do by default. A safer language would not only have memory / type safety but would consider integer overflow to be a bug unless marked as intended (Swift and Rust).
Considering it to be a bug doesn't mean that it actually MUST trap in production, but that it CAN trap. It should always trap in debug builds, and trapping in production is an option based on performance and availability vs. correctness decisions. It's a better approach.
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I meant, isn't "treating signed overflow as something that is guaranteed to never happen in order to optimize further" crucial to getting decent performance for int loops on LP64 platforms? I wasn't talking about trapping or not trapping, but wrapping in 32 bits vs. 64
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At some point our focus needs to switch from "how do we improve the experience for people writing new C code and adding new C optimizations" to "how do we minimize the risk of people who depend on C code written in 2007 that they don't understand"
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(and I say this as someone who's written new code for a new project in C this year)