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No, that's not what he means. He's saying that an external file system should have a sandboxed filesystem driver, so that exploiting a bug inside it doesn't immediately grant complete control over the entire system and at least requires privesc to escape (likely via the kernel).
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The vast majority of the Linux kernel has no need for memory unsafe code. Rust still offers full low-level control and in fact exposes more low-level features of the hardware than C, where you usually need to use tons of non-portable compiler intrinsics and more inline assembly.
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For existing code, it's definitely easier to implemented a sandbox than to rewrite it. There are plenty of new drivers and filesystems being written though. We're very likely to move on from filesystems like ext4 and existing drivers anyway, as we've done with most past ones.
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I don't think it makes sense to rewrite all the existing drivers for a platform in a memory safe language. I do think it makes sense to stop using C as the first choice for writing new drivers, especially since they should be outside the Linux kernel in an isolated process.
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