The "breaking interface contracts is a security enhancement" view is a very very harmful one. It's the opposite.
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Systems code should be written in something higher level than assembler but lower level than the symbolic execution system that C claims to provide currently. “Just use assembly” or “just use a type safe language” aren’t useful answers.
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Systems code benefits from memory and type safety even more than most other code because it's often in a position of trust and privilege. Using a language where unsafety can be contained and quickly wrapped into safe APIs is certainly useful advice for newly written systems code.
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The expectations of software robustness and security have increased a lot, and it's simply not realistic to achieve it while using unsafe tools making it much more difficult to write safe code. Writing something complex like an safe ext4 implementation is C is not very realistic.
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i.e. writing the entire thing with zero memory corruption bugs for an attacker to exploit either via an attacker controlled filesystem or an application. Drivers similarly have to be written treating the hardware and code using them as adversarial. Choice of tools is important.
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FS drivers do not belong in privileged contexts. The FS driver for an untrusted FS should be executing in a context where it can do nothing worse than store or retrieve wrong data.
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No, that's not what he means. He's saying that an external file system should have a sandboxed filesystem driver, so that exploiting a bug inside it doesn't immediately grant complete control over the entire system and at least requires privesc to escape (likely via the kernel).
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Feel free to look through the hundreds of ext4 CVEs and consider reading what I pointed you towards:
events.linuxfoundation.org/wp-content/upl
kroah.com/log/blog/2018/
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From the official documentation:
kernel.org/doc/html/lates
"The security team does not normally assign CVEs, nor do we require them for reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and may delay the bug handling."
That's for reported security vulnerabilities.
Most security fixes are implemented by the upstream developers, and they are certainly not getting CVE assignments. Even the security team is not getting CVE assignments for reported security vulnerabilities. Still, Linux is having hundreds of CVEs assigned every year despite it.