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HardenedBSD doesn't care about 32-bit arch's. The primary author of the paper had reached out to us during his research. He was very confused about how different ASLR implementations work. His testing methodology and algorithms weren't accurate. This research paper is flawed.
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The paxtest application has the proper algorithms to measure ASLR entropy. Note that paxtest cannot properly measure ASR entropy. FreeBSD is implementing ASR. This, paxtest cannot measure and compare between fbsd and hbsd.
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It's fair to use it on FreeBSD to measure what matters most though. Fine-grained heap randomization is a separate feature that's best layered on top, and can't be accomplished well at only the mmap layer. Especially true with jemalloc involved, which aligns the mmap heap, etc.
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ASLR can be extended with finer-grained bases via userspace features, and paxtest is mostly oblivious to that. It is capable of seeing one extremely tiny aspect of the difference between malloc implementations based on the entropy of one allocation between different executions.
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glibc: Heap randomization test (PIE): 32 quality bits (guessed) jemalloc: Heap randomization test (PIE): 23 quality bits (guessed) hardened_malloc: Heap randomization test (PIE): 41 quality bits (guessed) Entropy of a specific allocation is such a tiny aspect of it though.
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ASLR friendliness and fine-grained randomization (which it doesn't do) are a tiny aspect of malloc security though. Protected out-of-line metadata, detecting all invalid frees, canaries, quarantines, isolated partitions for different sizes / types, etc. are all more interesting.
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