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Font handling is also a large attack surface since font rendering is extremely complex and browsers expose it to untrusted input by supporting fonts provided by the site. CSS is super complex by itself and keeps getting more features that need to interact with all the others.
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There's literally a browser API which supports updating firmware on devices which mostly have no signature verification for the updates. The manufacturers consider that an important feature, even including the fact that there's no signature verification.
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They don't want to deal with supporting updates and modding securely, so they expose firmware updates via an API exposed through web browsers and leave out verifying the updates. A user allowing access ends up letting a site implant it with persistent malware without any exploit.
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These devices have a fair bit of attack surface and probably do need security updates though, and people wouldn't do it that way. It really needs signature verification and should check the origin of the update too along with requiring explicit consent to do it though.
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It generally does none of that. There's just an extensible API exposed via the MIDI API and they stick firmware updates into that. Any site given access to the device at all can do a firmware update, and often there's no signature verification. These companies don't really care.
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I think that's what Mozilla was proposing they are going to do, but there's a lot of push back from the users and device vendors because there's so much non-standard functionality. They seem to care a lot about allowing random sites to overwrite the firmware too... it's scary.
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Absolutely. I nuke it by preventing writes to the path at the filesystem level. Because somehow the browsers can't be bothered to add a switch or site permission for it...