I completely agree with @DanielMicay - this is the wrong conclusion. Hardware keys are the go to for maximum security. Your 'no' responses are incorrect for "implementation of software or device 100% Libre Software" and "can be independently reproduced and audited". @nitrokey
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I need backups for my keys. For a traditional HSM, that means I need to generate them on my computer, back them up onto cold storage and import them onto the HSM. If I ever need to do recovery, I need to expose them to a general purpose computer again too. That's problematic.
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Entering a passphrase directly on the device is another nice property of the Trezor Model T, but a traditional HSM can support that for encrypting keys and still wouldn't have the solid approach to recovery or the deniability from all passphrases leading to valid wallets/keys.
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I'd really like to see other implementations of the same model they've designed. There are many other cryptocurrency wallets doing it but it's just as applicable to U2F, SSH and GPG which are also provided by a Trezor. I'd like to see alternatives with compatible implementations.
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Another advantage is that the Trezor Model T has you confirm actions on the device for U2F, SSH, GPG, etc. It doesn't just have that for sending a Bitcoin transaction or verifying a receive address by showing it as text / qr code on the device. It has you confirm U2F/SSH/GPG use.
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The disadvantage of the deterministic wallet approach is you can't use it to important and secure existing keys, so you need a mechanism for key rotation. Similarly, if you decide to change the passphrase, that involves key rotation since keys are derived from seed + passphrase.
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It's how I'll be handling SSH, GPG and other keys in the future. The traditional HSM approach doesn't work for me because I need backups of the keys. For U2F, it's also silly you need recovery codes for each site. I have offline recovery for U2F as a whole with this approach.
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for the record, i actually wrote an implementation of OpenPGP smartcard emulation (á la Gnuk) for the Trezor One a few years back. the code is still in a branch on my GitHub, but never got around to refactoring and doing security review.
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It's the approach to the security model including recovery, passphrases and on-device input / confirmations that I like rather than the hardware though. I don't want to import keys generated on my computer or expose them to it from cold storage if I need to do recovery, etc.
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