It still needs to be kept updated too, and there would be massive attack surface simply for that. Simple update verification, full verified boot and downgrade protection with minimal state are important. The entire point is not having the attack surface of a general purpose OS.
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I think you're just misinterpreting that post and drawing the wrong conclusions. It's about a hardware attack, and a general purpose computer running Linux is far more vulnerable to the same kind of attacks. It ignores the passphrase feature and is unnecessarily dishonest too.
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It's far better to not have a general purpose OS when it's totally unnecessary. Only a tiny embedded application with thousands of lines of code, not millions, is needed. Running that tiny application on top of a massive general purpose OS would be a step backward in every way.
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I completely agree with - this is the wrong conclusion. Hardware keys are the go to for maximum security. Your 'no' responses are incorrect for "implementation of software or device 100% Libre Software" and "can be independently reproduced and audited".
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The comparison table is wrong when it comes to Nitrokey Start / Gnuk. Keys are encrypted, it is 100% libre software, can be audited, auditing isn't harder than GnuPG.
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I mentioned the Trezor earlier particularly Model T where passphrase and recovery seed can be entered on it directly. It has a different model than a typical HSM since it doesn't store anything other than the seed which is combined with entered passphrases to derive wallets/keys.
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It doesn't include any proprietary software and the whole thing is an open design that other people are able to build (and have successfully done so in practice). The primary purpose is for cryptocurrency wallets but it works well for U2F, GPG, SSH and various other purposes too.
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There are definitely options beyond proprietary ones, including options with much different approaches than a traditional HSM storing the keys with / without encryption (ideally with a passphrase entered onto the device). I really like the approach pioneered for Bitcoin wallets.
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Since that lets you generate keys on the hardware wallet, back up the high entropy recovery seed as a phrase, verify you backed it up correctly and then if you need to recover on a new device you can enter it directly onto a new hardware wallet without exposing it to a computer.
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The traditional approach is good if you have existing SSH and GPG keys that need to be moved onto an HSM. I'll definitely prefer the deterministic wallet approach for new keys though. It's not that bad to migrate to new SSH keys but GPG tends to make rotating keys very painful.
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Signing keys for firmware usually can't be rotated at all since they're burned into fuses so that's another case where a more traditional HSM is the best option since existing keys need to be migrated. Android app signing keys were similar, but they've finally added key rotation.
I really like the - code has been audited by so that is a huge plus in my book, and there's tons of eyes on the code as maintainers use them as well. Nothing against - they are an incredible company and I use their devices for btc
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I'm talking about the differences in the approach though, not implementations, i.e. recovery / backups, passphrase entry and deniability along with whether keys / passphrases need to be exposed to a general purpose computer as part of that.
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