how is your work on KSPP these days?
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I mostly stopped working on kernel hardening, especially submitting changes upstream, because I got tired of dealing with the toxic environment. I also increasingly feel Linux kernel security is a lost cause and I'm hopeful for a future with a microkernel + Linux compat layer.
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The Linux kernel is the equivalent of running the entirety of userspace as root in PID 1. There's no isolation or internal security model. It keeps getting worse as more and more complexity is piled on, all of it implemented in C and without any isolation between components.
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They've also introduced a very powerful bytecode interpreter / JIT compiler (eBPF) that's being increasingly used for different features.
I don't think the approach of piling on exploit mitigations to a project without safe tools (memory safe languages) and isolation can work.
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Exploit mitigations should be a final line of defence to raise the cost of attacks, not the entire basis for security. The *nix security model has also aged poorly and the only way to get decent security policies for userspace is SELinux combined with various ad-hoc features.
I think the people trying to hold back the tide of insecurity in the Linux kernel are doing valuable work, but I prefer working on things that are actually workable and not doomed to fail. I think Linux kernel security is getting worse over time, despite hardening efforts.
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Replying to
How do you view the progress in integrating grsec features? Is there still a lot to go?
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