I trust Linux dm-crypt / luks trust full disk encryption more. Once power is off, all bets are on. No compromise reports yet (when using strong passphrases). Can be combined with air gaped computer. ^PS
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The primary attack vector for a hardware wallet is an online attack. Linux has drastically more attack surface for either an online attack or physical attack vector when powered on. Trezor's passphrase feature doesn't store it so it's deniable with any number of hidden keys.
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Using Linux for this, especially with the typical userspace, is drastically less secure than running a tiny hardened crypto application in a minimal embedded environment. I don't understand why you would want that. Linux has garbage security even for a general purpose OS...
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... and this is a bad use case for a general purpose OS. It also doesn't store data but rather a seed used to generate keys to access data. The passphrase is appended to the seed phrase before deriving the main key from it. Encrypting it with the passphrase would be a downgrade.
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You linked to a post about a physical attack vector on an SoC which is entirely applicable to a Linux installation. The post is also dishonest and pushing misinformation, but you're misunderstanding it if you think Linux is better. Linux is far more vulnerable to the same attack.
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The mitigations implemented in the Trezor firmware against the attack wouldn't be present, and there would be drastically more attack surface. An attacker could much more easily gain code execution. An air gap doesn't remove online attack vectors at all.
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It still needs to be kept updated too, and there would be massive attack surface simply for that. Simple update verification, full verified boot and downgrade protection with minimal state are important. The entire point is not having the attack surface of a general purpose OS.
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I think you're just misinterpreting that post and drawing the wrong conclusions. It's about a hardware attack, and a general purpose computer running Linux is far more vulnerable to the same kind of attacks. It ignores the passphrase feature and is unnecessarily dishonest too.
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1) Aside from technical comparisons guys. The main drawback of the hype is in its real-world-usage. In the non-tech attack surface. While "shitty linux" computer is multipurpose tool, a low-value-target, the Trezor is a single purpose HVT. Your home address and payment..
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2) ..details lead to your RL persona, giving the attacker answer on who, when, where, what and how. Once you are reasonably interesting, 5$ wrench technique can be applied by an attacker.
The "shitty linux" user is not visible, and remains happily shitty 🤔
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It can be purchased with Bitcoin using a pseudonym and you aren't forced to send it to your home address.
It has a strong mitigation against attacks based on coercion via the passphrase feature. Every passphrase is valid and leads to a different key (i.e. different wallets).
I don't understand your proposed threat model anyway. You're suggesting that there will be a sophisticated targeted attack involving an attacker spying on you to the extent that they are aware of your purchase and target you. In that case, they would target a laptop too...
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The passphrase feature allows for completely deniable keys (wallets) because it doesn't store anything. It only stores the base seed phase that the passphrase is appended to. Every passphrase is valid and there's no persistent state on the device tied to which ones were used.
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It "can" be, means it will be ignored by most - see Zcash "optional" anonymous function.
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I purchased my Trezor with Bitcoin. The primary purpose is a Bitcoin wallet and I expect a lot of their customers purchase it that way. I don't understand your proposed threat model anyway. Someone targeting you like that could much more easily backdoor the laptop than this.