Daniel Micay on Twitter: "Preventing firmware upgrades on the security chip by someone with the signing keys is also a great feature and was introduced with the initial non-Titan security chip on the Pixel 2: https://t.co/SU0Jsz8vsS The main new feature is the StrongBox Keymaster (keystore on the chip)." / Twitter

twitter.com/redpig/status/ Exciting to hear that the Pixel 3 security chip will be open source with reproducible builds. That's a compelling reason for replacing the approach of using off-the-shelf hardware for the Pixel 2 security chip alongside reducing attack surface, etc.

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Will Drewry

@redpig

Oct 17, 2018

I’m really proud of what our team was able to accomplish: blog.google/products/pixel android-developers.googleblog.com/2018/10/buildi

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Daniel Micay

@DanielMicay

Preventing firmware upgrades on the security chip by someone with the signing keys is also a great feature and was introduced with the initial non-Titan security chip on the Pixel 2: android-developers.googleblog.com/2018/05/inside The main new feature is the StrongBox Keymaster (keystore on the chip).

10:28 PM · Oct 17, 2018Twitter Web Client

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I'll be able to add support for the StrongBox Keymaster to my Auditor app (github.com/AndroidHardeni). It may make sense to use both the TEE and StrongBox implementations at the same time, although bloating the QR codes for local verification wouldn't be a very desirable outcome.

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Daniel Micay

@DanielMicay

Oct 17, 2018

Ideally, Google would make the Titan M available to other vendors. An HSM with a solid design, great integration into AOSP and open source firmware with reproducible builds is a very compelling product. For now, it widens the security gap between Pixels and other Android phones.

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