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To what extend can an app guarantee a state of the system when the underlying integrity is not verifiable? How do you know a sample is genuine (1) and (2) even if it is, we take the report from a system difficult to verify even if AOSP. I am really glad you cont. working on this
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There's verified boot for the entire operating system and information about it is surfaced via the key attestation feature. It provides a signed public key certificate for the key including verified boot state + fingerprint and versions of the boot, system and vendor images.
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An attacker could exploit the OS after it boots or could exploit the verified boot process itself but they can't forge this information without exploiting the bootloader or TEE. An important part of what this provides is verification of device identity too, not just integrity.
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For example, consider an attacker compromising the OS after each boot and blocking updates to prevent fixing the vulnerabilities. Attestation will uncover the problem by showing that the OS is not truly being updated, even if the attacker tries to hide that information in the OS.
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The attestation and hardware-backed keystore capabilities will continue improving too. I implemented the app for the baseline provided by all devices launched with Android 8+ to have something useful and portable, but it's going to be expanded beyond these initial capabilities.
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