Danielle Lang

Early on, Judge Hinkle points out that the law of the land is that states can disenfranchise people with felony convictions, but he makes sure to remind us that the reasoning of that 1973 opinion is "not obvious."

Although Judge Hinkle uses the term "felon" in places -- he notes in footnote seven that where the context is clear, he uses citizens or individuals instead. Making obvious that he wants people with past convictions to know he aims to treat them with respect.

Or maybe this: "If this is the best the state's attorneys could do, one wonders how Mr. Gruver or the Division of elections could be expected to do better."

Judge Hinkle finds that people with past convictions, by and large, cannot afford to pay the staggering sums imposed on them: "The record now shows that the mine-run of felons affected by the pay-to-vote requirement are genuinely unable to pay."

The Court makes clear what was obvious to everyone, this new "system" was adopted "entirely as a litigation strategy."

Just adding this here because I really like it: "On voting issues, the old British maxim holds true: in for a penny, in for a pound."

And this assist: "With a flood of additional registrations expected in this presidential election year, the anticipated completion date might well be pushed into the 2030s."

The judge wrote his own takeaway to this section: "The takeaway: 18 months after Amendment 4 was adopted, the Division is not reasonably administering the pay-to-vote system and has not been given the resources needed to do so."

It's almost like he knew this opinion -- which enfranchises hundreds of thousands -- needed to be publicly digestible and not written in legalese.

Some important points on the fear of prosecution caused by this law: 1. "The deterrent effect is surely strong on individuals who have served their time, gone straight, and wish to avoid entanglement with the criminal-justice system."

2. "In Florida, where any voter can challenge any other voter’s eligibility, and where a mistake can lead to a prosecution, it is hardly surprising that a felon who is newly eligible to vote but unsure of the rules would decide not to risk it."

And again, the takeaway from Judge Hinkle: "The takeaway: it is certain that some eligible voters will choose not to vote because of the manner in which the State has administered—and failed to administer—the pay-to-vote system." Friendly amendment from me: many eligible voters.

A fun variation on the blood from a stone adage! "But one cannot get blood from a turnip or money from a person unable to pay."

Also: "one might well question the legitimacy of the State’s interest in leveraging its control over eligibility to vote to improve the State’s financial position." I do, indeed, question that.

The court holds that the fees imposed to fund the State's programs are taxes: "A tax by any other name."

And on the new registration form? "The form is indefensible, provides no opportunity for some eligible felons to register at all, and is sure to discourage others."