Cas Cremers

@CasCremers

Professor of Computer Science, Faculty at CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security

Vrijeme pridruživanja: veljača 2016.

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  1. proslijedio/la je Tweet
    prije 15 sati

    How about one week of talks, workshops, and discussions on hot topics in IT Security plus a social program with , Mario Fritz? Apply now for CISPA's SeCon taking place in Saarbruecken. More details:

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  2. proslijedio/la je Tweet
    30. sij

    I keep watching MLS standards efforts closely - this is still one of the most interesting developments in the messaging space in the last 10 years or so. Not perfect, but it's possible that this will become the best compromise we have right now.

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  3. 18. sij

    By choosing the right parameters for C', you can know the private key for C' -- even when you don't know the private key for C -- as Vaudenay noted in 2004.

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  4. 18. sij

    When comparing a received cert to cached root certs, windows only compared the public keys, but not the parameters, and would therefore assume that a received fake root cert C' with different parameters was the same as a cached root cert C, using C' to verify the cert chain.

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  5. 16. sij

    Curve Validation Error

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  6. proslijedio/la je Tweet

    Thank you to , who stepped down as co-chair of the Crypto Forum Research Group today, after many years of service. Welcome to , who joins and as co-chair going forward.

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  7. 15. sij

    This degenerate case was just confirmed to work by , thank you! ( )

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  8. 15. sij

    1. Find an ecc root cert C 2. Create C' with the same public key and curve but set the generator to the public key of C 3. Create a normal signing cert C'' with key pair (pk'',sk'') and sign software/cert with sk'' 4. Sign C'' with sk=1 5. Ship software/cert with C'' and C'

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  9. 15. sij

    Can someone please confirm/deny if this degenerate version works? (It is still Vaudenay 2004 but with d' the identity) It would be easier to detect in logs of course.

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  10. proslijedio/la je Tweet
    15. sij
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  11. 15. sij
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  12. 15. sij

    1. Find an ecc root cert C with pk 2. Apply Vaudenay|(Pornin&Stern) 2004 get C' with sk',params' for that pk 3. Create a normal code signing cert C'' with key pair (pk'',sk'') and sign software with sk'' 4. Sign C'' with sk' 5. Present software,C'',C' to windows' sigcheck64.exe

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  13. 15. sij

    Based on what I know now, I think the attack fits into a single tweet, including references:

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  14. 14. sij

    This is ultimately similar to Pornin and Stern (2005). (Which we built on for )

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  15. 14. sij

    Pre-patch, a cert can be used if the hash of the public key matches one in the cert root, after which the parameters of the new cert get used, enabling Vaudenay's attack. The patch requires the curve parameters to be the same, preventing this attack.

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  16. 14. sij
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  17. 14. sij

    It looks like it exploits what Vaudenay warned against in 2004 : "Digital Signature Schemes with Domain Parameters" ( )

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  18. proslijedio/la je Tweet
    14. sij

    Recent paper on tricky crypto bugs in signature systems, including similarities to today's CVE. Will read this weekend, thanks for sharing (and writing) it Seems Legit: Automated Analysis of Subtle Attacks on Protocols that Use Signatures

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  19. proslijedio/la je Tweet
    14. sij

    The last MLS interim meeting in NYC this weekend was a productive one! We talked about metadata protection, stronger authentication, deniability, improvements to post-compromise forward security, ciphersuites, symbolic analysis and decentralisation.

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  20. 14. sij

    It's a great opportunity, have a look!

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