And the line between good care and blatent negligence is so thin, you normally can’t see it. All day, every day, dancing along an invisible boundary, guesstimating your way thru unresearched territory. A swamp of uncertainty. You sometimes see islands. And miss the mined areas.
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If BawaGarba only had one little person to concentrate on that day the care would’ve been different. Rather than her being a pilot it was more like running air traffic control but without all the sophisticated technology appraising of the whole system
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Basic Q: Are stats likely to exist to show what the actual caseload for Dr BG and Nurse A was? Eg I see in the Appeal summary it says “a 15 bed/ chair unit”. How many patients went through that unit in the shift? How many were Dr BG and Nurse A also responsible for, elsewhere?
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Good question. I was about to make the point (not for the first time) that without the transcript, we none of us know the full facts here.
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Far less than that number, because of the redundancy in that system. Little redundancy in medicine.
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Is this really about error or about how you deal with error?
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Its about both.
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Generally, the comparison doesn't hold (aviation is much simpler), but the Uberlingen accident had some parallel issues. https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/T154_/_B752,_en-route,_Uberlingen_Germany,_2002 …pic.twitter.com/ipiNbtEkro
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That wouldn't be an example from aviation safety where
#safestaffing levels were demanded, would it? Interesting... -
Staffing was changed immediately after Uberlingen. See also https://www.eurocontrol.int/sites/default/files/article/content/documents/nm/safety/safety-selected-safety-issues-for-staffing-atc-operations.pdf … Re: 1) Staffing in degraded systems operations. 2) Staffing during workload extremes. 3) Staffing during night work. 4) Single Person Operations. 5) Position handover. 6) On-the-Job Training.
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Legal outcome http://m.dw.com/en/swiss-court-convicts-four-air-traffic-control-managers/a-2765480?xtref=https%253A%252F%252Fwww.google.co.uk%252F … 4 managers convicted of negligent manslaughter "The judge said the Skyguide managers had failed to exercise sufficient care by leaving just one air traffic controller in charge of the southern German and eastern Swiss airspace at the time."
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But completely different jurisdiction & not a common law jurisdiction so interesting but not really relevant.
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Surely “instructive” rather than “interesting but irrelevant”? Why/how could Swiss legal system hold managers accountable and bring about safety enhancing change when our legal/criminal justice system apparently finds it “all too difficult” ?
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And Swiss law is notoriously strict on these matters. The bar for prosecution of front line staff for mistakes is lower than in the UK.
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No co-pilot no take-off.
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Appreciated. I know it's a flawed comparison - I spent 2 days fending off doctors telling me so, having dared to consider the impact relative candour might have in each field's safety record. Since the Matthew Syed piece was supportive tho, people don't seem to mind so much. :)
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Difference between medicine and aviation: The pilot goes down along with the passengers.
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