I'm back at @ForeignPolicy writing about the task of training auxiliaries, comparing American failures with Roman successes.https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/03/us-military-auxiliary-armies-afghanistan-rome/ …
Näytä tämä ketju
-
An interesting American example is its much more successful policy in South Korea. There, they pursued parallel auxiliary relations with a "local" army (the ROKA, often led by ex-IJA officers rather distasteful to both the US and civilian ROK leaders) and the deracinated KATUSA.
We should be explicit here: it meant accepting the dictatorship of Park Chung-hee for years rather than trying to create a democratic South Korea (a thing which emerged later).
-
-
But we're obviously not at all interested in letting a left regime like Cuba evolve (as it has been doing per people who've been there) into something more economically mixed and democratic. Obama made steps in the right direction. Now?
Kiitos. Käytämme tätä aikajanasi parantamiseen. KumoaKumoa
-
-
-
In the period of active military conflict, though (i.e. pre-April-Revolution), it elevated officers like Park that were deeply feared by the Americans' preferred, less-locally-rooted, and also non-democratic Rhee government.
-
The US clearly didn't care about democracy in this period, but at the real decision points in the heat of the war, the more important distinction was between an English-speaking elite that had spent the imperial period in exile, and Imperial Japanese Army veterans.
Keskustelun loppu
Uusi keskustelu -
Lataaminen näyttää kestävän hetken.
Twitter saattaa olla ruuhkautunut tai ongelma on muuten hetkellinen. Yritä uudelleen tai käy Twitterin tilasivulla saadaksesi lisätietoja.