Voit lisätä twiitteihisi sijainnin, esimerkiksi kaupungin tai tarkemman paikan, verkosta ja kolmannen osapuolen sovellusten kautta. Halutessasi voit poistaa twiittisi sijaintihistorian myöhemmin. Lue lisää
I'm back at @ForeignPolicy writing about the task of training auxiliaries, comparing American failures with Roman successes.https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/03/us-military-auxiliary-armies-afghanistan-rome/ …
The predictable 'didn't read the article to the end' criticism here is to say that I am advocating returning to bad old imperial models. That's not what I'm saying. We need to learn from those models, for sure, but learning from doesn't mean imitating.
Instead, my point here is that the scale of the goals of intervention and the desire to avoid imperialism (or at least the appearance of it) are in quite direct tension, a tension which we have generally refused to acknowledge because it leads to unpleasant conclusions.
But the tension is real! and it comes out clearly when thinking about training local forces. If you want to radically remake a society (say alter its civil & military institutions & rewrite its gender norms), you are going to have to do some imperialist, even colonial things.
My own view is instead that we need to trim back our objectives to things which can be achieved largely through local institutions. That means we can't fix every problem! It places hard limits on what an intervention can achieve and we need to accept those limits.
But in either case, we need to give up the notion of getting maximal solutions out of minimal investment and dislocation. These are trade-off questions and worse yet, ones where 'split the difference' approaches generally fail.
So if full on imperialism, complete with semi-permanent colonial governance is politically unacceptable (and in my view it should be) then you have to accept that only a very limited range of objectives - mostly just picking which pre-existing local elites rule - are possible.
An interesting American example is its much more successful policy in South Korea. There, they pursued parallel auxiliary relations with a "local" army (the ROKA, often led by ex-IJA officers rather distasteful to both the US and civilian ROK leaders) and the deracinated KATUSA.
There, of course, the policy was built under conditions of extreme military pressure, and in a period of more recent openly-imperial experience in the Philippines.
Some interesting discussion. I ran a training scenario for a platoon of Sandhurst cadets a few years ago on Roman handling of guerrilla warfare in South Wales. We had a very interesting discussion on the role and use of auxiliary units.
We drew some very interesting comparisons with US, UK etc. military strategy in Iraq in the 'second Gulf War'. The Roman approach provided excellent food for thought. We'd hoped to repeat the scenario for command staff but didn't get the chance!
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