Bret Devereaux

At this point, even the more robust defenses of the air war in Europe circle around arguments like 'well it at least lured the Luftwaffe into the air where it could be destroyed" (which, to be fair, I think there is something to that argument). But 'morale bombing' failed.

My understanding is this remains a thorny debate, our primary evidence for thinking within Japanese high command is inconsistent (and also frequently self-serving) and so historians still argue about the relative importance of the key factors leading to surrender.

At least some members of the Japanese government were trying to put out peace feelers before the atomic bombings or the USSR (as early as late July). On the flip side, even on August 9th, the cabinet was deadlocked making it hard to say what the crucial determinant was.

The ability of the USA to drop additional bombs was apparently a major consideration in the final discussions leading up to the surrender, as was the (dim) prospect of actually repelling a US landing on the mainland, in addition to the entry of the USSR.

You have to remember the tremendous focus in IJN/IJA military though on 'decisive battles' - the hope the military was pinning things on was that an allied landing could be thrown back with such losses as to force a negotiated settlement.

Industrial destruction via strategic bombing wouldn't alter that calculus meaningfully - but the prospect that with nuclear weapons a land invasion might be *unnecessary* because the island could be scoured clean from the air, did.