Bret Devereaux

The over-the-horizon line feels to me like more of the cult of airpower. Honestly I keep thinking I should assign ch2 of the Hardest Place (the strike on the Rabbanis compound) to my Global History of Warfare students..."Read this and write an essay on the limits of airpower."

I'd argue that WWII Japan is the trickiest example - it is clearly the closest that strategic airpower ever got to winning a war. The more one-sided example is actually the air-war in Europe.

At this point, even the more robust defenses of the air war in Europe circle around arguments like 'well it at least lured the Luftwaffe into the air where it could be destroyed" (which, to be fair, I think there is something to that argument). But 'morale bombing' failed.

My understanding is this remains a thorny debate, our primary evidence for thinking within Japanese high command is inconsistent (and also frequently self-serving) and so historians still argue about the relative importance of the key factors leading to surrender.

At least some members of the Japanese government were trying to put out peace feelers before the atomic bombings or the USSR (as early as late July). On the flip side, even on August 9th, the cabinet was deadlocked making it hard to say what the crucial determinant was.