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My understanding is this remains a thorny debate, our primary evidence for thinking within Japanese high command is inconsistent (and also frequently self-serving) and so historians still argue about the relative importance of the key factors leading to surrender.
At least some members of the Japanese government were trying to put out peace feelers before the atomic bombings or the USSR (as early as late July). On the flip side, even on August 9th, the cabinet was deadlocked making it hard to say what the crucial determinant was.
The ability of the USA to drop additional bombs was apparently a major consideration in the final discussions leading up to the surrender, as was the (dim) prospect of actually repelling a US landing on the mainland, in addition to the entry of the USSR.
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