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One thing at work here, I suspect, is the shaping effect that public opinion places. Historically speaking, most empires, hegemons, great powers, etc. have been very comfortable waging expressly punitive expeditions in response to being attacked.
But the American self-conception makes it hard to justify a punitive operation as a resolve-showing-measure. We *do* lots of punitive operations, but we have to call them something else, or pretend they're actually intended to alter behavior or deter or what have you.
One wonders if perhaps we'd have been more honest w/ ourselves if we admitted at the outset that we were just going to take revenge on the Taliban by doing lots of violence to them for a period of 10-20 years instead of imagining we were going to liberalize&modernize Afghanistan.
Idk, but I highly recommend Wes Morgan's new book on the Pech Valley to explore the questions of who exactly we were fighting there and what the reasoning was.
That's a super interesting angle on this Bret, although I wonder how long the punitive motive lasted in AF. Like, who are we punishing at this point? Again, I'm not necessarily for Biden's withdrawal, but I'm looking for better args than Stephens'.
I think I am for withdrawal, but I'd like to see a real effort at promise-keeping, re: translators and other allies. Either bring them here or set up the peace so as to establish a city-state of Kabul and send them there.
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