I have thoughts on this topic forthcoming in two different places, but broadly I think this is correct. American civ-mil has real problems and we need to course correct. I increasingly think the AVF itself is not the right force for the road ahead, but also issues at home.https://twitter.com/RadioFreeTom/status/1383805599154991121 …
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Vastauksena käyttäjälle @BretDevereaux
Out of curiosity about that last point - what do you think has changed to make a volunteer force no longer suitable?
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Vastauksena käyttäjälle @AsaZernik
Uh, short version: rising internal political tensions, weaknesses in civ-mil relationship, shift back to near-peer deterrence and need for future capacity over present capabilities. Long version...uh, to appear soonish, I hope?
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Vastauksena käyttäjälle @BretDevereaux
I was more interested in the non-internal-political reasons, given that you and Tom had discussed that fairly thoroughly already. Do you think the AVF had any benefits aside from bypassing Vietnam fatigue at its late-Cold-War adoption?
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Vastauksena käyttäjille @AsaZernik ja @BretDevereaux
(I am very interested in the issue, coming from both Israeli and American backgrounds.)
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Vastauksena käyttäjälle @AsaZernik
An AVF opens up strategic options for longer military involvement far-away at lower 'will' cost. It is not clear to me that is always a good thing. But near-peer conflicts tend to demand mass conscript armies and rapidly converting from an AVF to a mass conscript army is hard.
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Vastauksena käyttäjälle @BretDevereaux
The introduction of the AVF, though, came in the late Cold War - much closer to the latter case. That historical transition is the part that's really interesting to me - was that the desire for small wars without a public opinion hit outweighing the USSR peer threat?
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Vastauksena käyttäjälle @AsaZernik
Yes, the AVF was a pretty clear response to draft resistance - just like the Roman shift to volunteers in the back third of the second century BC, though there is complexity here.
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Vastauksena käyttäjille @BretDevereaux ja @AsaZernik
But part of what the Gates Commission did was assure everyone that an American AVF could be rapidly scaled up. It presented a 'have your cake and eat it too' rationale for the shift everyone already wanted to make (Nixon had already been elected on eliminating the draft).
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Vastauksena käyttäjille @BretDevereaux ja @AsaZernik
I have a public-facing piece coming up which essentially spends 5,500 words calling BS on the Gates Commission's optimistic appraisal and suggesting a sober reading of, inter alia, Roman history, ought to have suggested some of the problems they explained away were real.
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In part because we are now seeing those exact problems - an inability to scale up, isolation and alienation of the AVF, increasing peacetime cost, etc - quite vividly.
Of course the Gates Commission didn't include any historians so.............




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Vastauksena käyttäjälle @BretDevereaux
Wait they thought there was a scale-up path on the timescales of a modern war??? (That slow scale-up *did* work for the World Wars, but that was a very different time.)
0 vastausta 0 uudelleentwiittausta 0 tykkäystäKiitos. Käytämme tätä aikajanasi parantamiseen. KumoaKumoa
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