Deploying to the Med. without the ability to control or influence either Gibraltar or the Suez seems like a good way to lose part of your fleet instantly at the beginning of hostilities - much like the fate of German naval squadrons at sea when WWI broke out?
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Sure. I just think we ought to acknowledge that the geography is challenging for the PRC. The US Navy has two coastlines, joined by a canal we more-or-less control. Our communications in the Pacific run past a lot of islands that are friendly or we control.
For the PRC operating in the Med., their lines run through a strait they may not control, past the coast of a regional geostrategic rival, through a sea they may not control, through a canal they don't control. It's not impossible, but it's trickier.
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They have a lot more diplomacy to do before that's workable. And obviously part of the Belt-and-Road is designed to lay the groundwork for that, with mixed success.
Kiitos. Käytämme tätä aikajanasi parantamiseen. KumoaKumoa
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Fair point. But even influence ops require logistics - if it were you, where would you think you'd need supply bases to maintain a naval presence in the Med. when your home port is Zhanjiang? I've never run the numbers on that kind of thing for modern ships.
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