Bret Devereaux

The thing is, states where the military has effectively insulated itself from civilian control have pretty consistent records of awful decision-making. The classic examples of this are Germany, 1871-1919 and Japan 1920-1945. 4/14

The thing is, civilian leaders have a very different job then military ones. As Clausewitz notes (drink!) the political leaders manage the 'when/why' of war (the political object) whereas the military leaders manage the 'how' of war (dealing with friction, etc.). 5/14

Clausewitz is quite clear that there is subordination between these elements and that the political object is supreme - that's the significance of 'war is policy by other means.' 6/14

But the creation of a norm whereby the only people fit to make military decisions are military people fosters an independence of military leaders from civilian direction and thus tends to prioritize the 'how' over the 'why/when' to disastrous effect. 7/14

That's how you get military leaders backing Germany into a war with France because in 1914 because their plan didn't allow for anything else - they let the 'how' of winning the war dictate the 'why' - 'why fight France' - because that was the how-plan! 8/14

Likewise, thinking within the IJN prior to 1941 became so focused on the 'how' of defeating the USN that it eclipsed the 'why' of fighting the USN (there was no good 'why' because such a war was fundamentally unwinnable). 9/14

Consequently, the IJN precipitated a war with a surprise attack that made the only possible victory scenario - a limited war with limited public support in the USA - impossible and replaced it with the nightmare scenario of a war of annihilation with a much stronger foe. 10/14

It is an irony that deserves to be better known, but countries where 'war is too serious to be left to the military' (in Clemenceau's famous quip), while they have suffered from political meddling, in the long run generally have better leadership. 11/14