Bret Devereaux

Being more uncertain or cagey about when the US would use force would be helpful too. I don’t think tying hands with firmer commitments has actually done anything to deter Chinese bad behavior (see East China Sea post article 5).

China couldn’t seriously discount the possibility of US intervention but allies also wouldn’t be certain of help, which will prompt balancing on their part. I don’t think the prospect of allies bandwagoning with China on security is credible.

Openly abandoning security commitments as part of a negotiated process to create spheres of influence is something I’m not opposed to in principle. But such an approach only works if China abides and the last four years in particular throw that into doubt. So we shouldn’t do it.

Taiwan is the biggest problem here because of proximity. Other Asian countries that have more distance between them and China can create their own A2/AD areas that would deter large scale attacks. But Taiwan is so close to mainland China that it won’t work

IMO: Taiwan needs to reinstate conscription, get really good at guerrilla warfare tactics, bet big on precision strike, and porcupine up. US should help in this effort via arms sales.

But if the balloon goes up I don’t see a viable way for the US to ride to the rescue in a way that doesn’t produce an unacceptably high risk of nuclear use. So id vote for staying out. But I think combo of a more resilient Taiwan & possibility of US intervention does enough

And in any case: reduction of forward US naval and air presence to replace with land based missile forces would be way to go. Provides deterrence options while reducing PRC preemption incentives. Stronger allies provide time to consider response options.

Not necessarily zero out naval and air. But boy oh boy those are really really juicy targets right now which doesn’t bode well for crisis stability/escalation control