Because I don't know that this does that. @EmmaMAshford presents the shift to great power competition with China as a situation where we have asked 'how' (and answered, 'build ships') before we have asked 'why' and if we should even have competition at all. 3/18
I would suggest that the PRC's attitude towards allowed speech in many other countries (e.g. a lot of the 'wolf warrior' diplomacy) suggests that PRC's goals would not be limited to territorial hegemony, but would include democratic backsliding.
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Yes, on all issues of core Chinese interests - Tibet, Xinjiang, CCP, Taiwan, India claims. But Beijing doesn't care if country X has internal democratic battles over anything else. It lives happily for e.g. with deep debates in S.Korea and Pakistan.
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Beijing is not trying to globally export an "non-democracy" as an ideology outside the parameters I listed; at least I don't see evidence of that. It is not an ideological state (for export), but a hard realist, territorial state. Xi's "Maoism" is for legitimacy not revolution.
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