Bret Devereaux

2) We pull out of the eastern pacific, but clear the way for Japan and South Korea to become nuclear weapon states, capable of deterring China in their backyards on their own but also potentially sparking runaway nuclear proliferation. 11/18

3) We stay in the eastern pacific, and since our goals (democratic and independent Taiwan, S. Korea, etc) conflict with the PRC's goals, we engage in great power competition over those conflicts. 12/xx

Option (2) has been unacceptable for a long time, and I don't think Ashford or anyone else is arguing at this point to just hand everyone nukes and see where the chips (and fallout) falls. 13/18

But here is where I want the disengagement doves to be more honest about their position: disengagement almost certainly means selling Taiwan into the same oppression as Hong Kong. It probably means other E. Asian states becoming PRC satellites. 14/18

The same policy, applied in Europe, would be similarly bad news for the Baltic states. And there is an argument there, a sort of every-democracy-for-itself why-should-we-have-to-pay-for-it argument. 15/18

But I want the people making that argument to be *honest* about it, that it means throwing many of the world's small democracies to the wolves because no % of GDP spending is going to let Taiwan beat the PRC alone (or Lithuania beat Russia). 16/18

It seems that the great majority of foreign policy experts, of politicians, and of American voters find that unacceptable though. And *that* is why we're pivoting to great power competition, which is why, as @mattyglesias puts it, we're building more boats. 17/18