Bret Devereaux

My quibble is mostly given that the Weeds presents these segments functionally as 'explainers' rather than as more directly persuasive, argumentative pieces. They are supposed to give people a sense of the state of Biden's policy and perhaps the state of the debate. 2/18

Because I don't know that this does that. @EmmaMAshford presents the shift to great power competition with China as a situation where we have asked 'how' (and answered, 'build ships') before we have asked 'why' and if we should even have competition at all. 3/18

And she expresses frustration at a debate that - the podcast seems to suggest - never took place. But it did take place! It took place all OVER the place. It's been everywhere! 4/18

And so it seems to me that this debate did take place in both policy and public circles, and that it is also true that a shift towards great power competition with China won in both, by some margin. "We debated and my side lost" is not the same as "no debate happened." 7/18

More broadly, I was frustrated in the discussion because saying 'no debate took place' precluded discussing *why* the stance has changed the way it has which in turn I thought didn't really present an understandable case for why Biden is going where he's going. 8/18

So here is my version of it, from what I've read. The fundamental problem is this: given China's size, economic influence and military power, and its clearly expressed territorial and hegemonic goals (e.g. Hong Kong, Nine Dash Line, skirmishes w/ India)...9/18

The USA is left to choose between three basic scenarios. 1) We pull out of the eastern pacific, leaving Taiwan, the Philippines, S. Korea and to a lesser extent Japan to fall under the hegemonic influence of China. 10/18

2) We pull out of the eastern pacific, but clear the way for Japan and South Korea to become nuclear weapon states, capable of deterring China in their backyards on their own but also potentially sparking runaway nuclear proliferation. 11/18

3) We stay in the eastern pacific, and since our goals (democratic and independent Taiwan, S. Korea, etc) conflict with the PRC's goals, we engage in great power competition over those conflicts. 12/xx

Option (2) has been unacceptable for a long time, and I don't think Ashford or anyone else is arguing at this point to just hand everyone nukes and see where the chips (and fallout) falls. 13/18

But here is where I want the disengagement doves to be more honest about their position: disengagement almost certainly means selling Taiwan into the same oppression as Hong Kong. It probably means other E. Asian states becoming PRC satellites. 14/18

The same policy, applied in Europe, would be similarly bad news for the Baltic states. And there is an argument there, a sort of every-democracy-for-itself why-should-we-have-to-pay-for-it argument. 15/18

But I want the people making that argument to be *honest* about it, that it means throwing many of the world's small democracies to the wolves because no % of GDP spending is going to let Taiwan beat the PRC alone (or Lithuania beat Russia). 16/18

It seems that the great majority of foreign policy experts, of politicians, and of American voters find that unacceptable though. And *that* is why we're pivoting to great power competition, which is why, as @mattyglesias puts it, we're building more boats. 17/18