Bret Devereaux

We elect one president once every four years. I'm just not that worried about crime waves touched off by people whose escape plan is getting elected to the presidency.

I am not worried about local muggers running for office. What I am worried about is the 'Julius Caesar scenario': laws stop mattering in politics because holding office renders one (effectively or de jure) immune to prosecution.

In the consular elections of 60BC, Caesar engaged in extensive bribery and corruption because he knew that once elected, he would be immune from prosecution in his consular year (consuls, by virtue of holding 'imperium' could not be prosecuted).

Then, during his consulship, he did quite a bit more blatantly illegal action, because he had already arranged to be given a position with imperium the following year (a proconsular command in Gaul).

Fast forward about a decade and Caesar is marching on Rome because political changes in Rome mean that he cannot secure another command with imperium, which means he's about to become a private citizen with literally ten years of obvious, public crimes to be prosecuted for.

So the issue here is not that every cutpurse will run for high office. The issue here is that if we set the precedent that winning high office renders one immune to prosecution, we've incentivized a **lot** of law-breaking in order to land in high office...

...and effectively infinite law-breaking in order to remain in high office. That's not a great set of norms to set in place. Once someone leaves office, there has to be accountability at some stage.

Since we're talking incentives ... wouldn't this give people incentives not to leave office?