I think your idea of what the field of military history looks like, beyond the pop-books about the ACW, may be a bit outdated. Drum-and-Trumpet history like that hasn't really been the core of the field for 40+ years now, even if it sells at battlefield parks.
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The issue is that mil-historians are generally trying to explain outcomes. We'll give accounts of battles and campaigns, but the tendency is to see the role of organization, technology or social context as more determinative of outcomes (who wins/achieves objectives).
Which ought to make sense! How often is public policy the story of "this one mid-level or upper-level bureaucrat rolls in and revolutionized everything all on their own, by their own genius" It happens, right? But not often.
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More often what you see is "this result was the consequence of complex institutional incentives, existing bureaucratic culture and the expectations of broader society which shaped the possibility-space of decision-making." Turns out, armies work the same way.
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So we're stuck with the hard task of trying to write a more complete, useful history, while competing against, as you put it, right-wing weirdos selling a simplified, unhelpful version.
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