The worst problem is a 'strategy' without an end-state (strategy without strategy). That is a sneakier trap than it sounds. Decision-makers on the ground are absorbed by the day-to-day of (3), making it easy to telescope in and lose sight of end-state goals... 6/20
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Ask yourself - what is the end-state here? Is it something I want? Are multiple end-states mutually exclusive (e.g. undermine influence of country Y, but also leave region) What are the means intended to produce the end-state? Are they likely to actually do that? 17/20
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And are actions being justified on strategic grounds ('this gets us where we are going') or emotional grounds - e.g. 'he was a bad guy' or 'getting them back.' Clausewitz sets the strategic layer - w/ the political object - in the realm of *reason* deliberately. 18/20
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Not that the emotional - will - is pointless in war. It's in that trinity too! Moral grounds matter - a strategy that requires immoral means is bad strategy and unlikely to succeed because it undermines the will to continue. But strategy is in the head, not the heart. 19/20
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And no citizen (or citizen-soldier) in a democracy should accept political leaders who aren't willing to be up-front about what the national strategy is, and how we're trying to achieve it. Something is very wrong if nobody outside DoD/State knows WTF is going on or why. end/20
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