Back to our 3 parts: strategic failures are usually in (2) and (3). (1) - current assessment - is crucial of course. No map will help you if you don't know where you are in the first place. But those are usually intelligence failures, and their own issue. 5/20
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...ends (surrender, moral collapse) being mostly wishful thinking. So the next time you see Important Leader Person getting up on a microphone and explaining what they've done, or are going to do, listen for any traces of actual strategy. 16/20
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Ask yourself - what is the end-state here? Is it something I want? Are multiple end-states mutually exclusive (e.g. undermine influence of country Y, but also leave region) What are the means intended to produce the end-state? Are they likely to actually do that? 17/20
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And are actions being justified on strategic grounds ('this gets us where we are going') or emotional grounds - e.g. 'he was a bad guy' or 'getting them back.' Clausewitz sets the strategic layer - w/ the political object - in the realm of *reason* deliberately. 18/20
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Not that the emotional - will - is pointless in war. It's in that trinity too! Moral grounds matter - a strategy that requires immoral means is bad strategy and unlikely to succeed because it undermines the will to continue. But strategy is in the head, not the heart. 19/20
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And no citizen (or citizen-soldier) in a democracy should accept political leaders who aren't willing to be up-front about what the national strategy is, and how we're trying to achieve it. Something is very wrong if nobody outside DoD/State knows WTF is going on or why. end/20
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