There's truth to that characterization, which I think is illustrative here: Rome's allies, in many cases, stayed allies (while they did) because it was in their interest. The Italian allies of Rome (the socii) got their share of the loot, got to march in the victory parade...2/
I think that gets the benefits of NATO to the US - *our* part of the interest calculation - wrong. We pay for our part in NATO because the risk of a near-peer conflict is so great that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Let me put that in a thought experiment...12/
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Let's say the base chance of a near-peer conflict is just 5% normally in the next 50 years, but without NATO (and our security commitments in East Asia) it rises to 15%. WWII cost something like $300bn at the time, or something like 4.1 trillion inflation adjusted. 13/
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Just to the USA, not counting the cost in blood. If we assume that the near-peer conflict deterred by the 'off-the-table' effect would be of similar magnitude (I suspect it would be worse), the value of reducing its chance of happening by 10% over 50 years...14/
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